چکیده مقاله
Agency conflict in accounting has traditionally been modeled as a linear principal agent problem However, this study argues that agency conflict is inherently a non cooperative strategic game where managers and shareholders simultaneously anticipate each other's strategies under information asymmetry Drawing on John Nash's equilibrium concept, we develop an extended causal framework linking divergent interests → information asymmetry → strategic earnings management → Nash equilibrium outcomes → earnings quality Our analysis reveals two dominant equilibrium types: i a Pareto optimal equilibrium characterized by low earnings management and trust based monitoring, yielding high earnings quality; and ii a Pareto inferior equilibrium marked by high manipulation and intense monitoring, yielding low earnings quality Internal control quality and corporate governance strength serve as equilibrium shifters that determine which Nash equilibrium is selected We derive policy implications for regulators, audit committees, and investors, suggesting that institutional designs altering the payoff structure for manipulation are more effective than direct honesty mandates This study contributes to agency theory by reframing it within game theory and provides a unified causal model for understanding earnings quality as a system property emerging from strategic interaction
کلیدواژهها
نویسندگان
Seyed Alireza Khezri
Corresponding Author, Department of Accounting, Qa c , Qazvin Branch, Qazvin, Iran
شیوه ارجاع
khezri، Seyed Alireza،1405،Agency Conflict in Accounting A Game-Theoretic Analysis Based on Nash Equilibrium and Earnings Quality،هفتمین همایش بین المللی علوم سیاسی، مدیریت، اقتصاد و حسابداری،همدان
ارائهشده در
مجموعه مقالات هفتمین همایش بین المللی علوم سیاسی، مدیریت، اقتصاد و حسابداری17 مرداد 1405 · همدان