چکیده مقاله
Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time Single sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute e g price are very popular Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single sided and single attribute auctions Nonetheless, thisadds the complexity of the auction Any auction mechanism needs to be budget balanced,Pareto optimal, individually rational, and coalition proof Satisfying all these properties is not so much trivial so that no multi attribute double auction mechanism could address allthese limitations This research analyzes and compares the GM, timestamp based and social welfaremaximization mechanisms for multi attribute double auctions The analysis of the simulation results shows that the algorithm proposed by Gimple and Makio satisfies moreproperties compared to other methods for such an auction mechanism This multi attribute double auction mechanism is based on game theory and behaves fairer in matching and arbitration
کلیدواژهها
نویسندگان
Yasaman Sarlati
B Sc Student, Department of Information Technology Engineering, Faculty of Engineering
Simin Naghavi
University of Isfahan, Iran
Faria Nassiri Mofakham
University of Isfahan, Iran
شیوه ارجاع
Sarlati, Yasaman and Naghavi, Simin and Nassiri Mofakham, Faria,1392,A Comparison Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms,7th International Conference on e- Commerce whit focus on e-Security,Kish Island
ارائهشده در
مجموعه مقالات هشتمین کنفرانس بین المللی تجارت الکترونیک با رویکرد بر اعتماد الکترونیکی4 اردیبهشت 1393 · مشهد