چکیده مقاله
This paper presents an integrative behavioral–strategic framework for analyzing the co evolution of moral signaling, implicit belief updating, and cannibalization in sustainable markets Building on Bayesian game theory and cognitive psychology, the model conceptualizes sustainability competition as an information feedback system in which firms transmit moral signals while consumers update probabilistic beliefs about authenticity, fairness, and value under uncertainty Consumer decision making is represented through a Bayesian inference mechanism and a fairness adjusted utility function that incorporates moral framing and informational precision Simulation analyses demonstrate that the equilibrium outcomes depend critically on the ratio between framing intensity and signal informativeness Moderate signaling preserves trust, coherence, and profitability, while excessive signaling under ambiguous information leads to moral fatigue, market inefficiency, and intensified intra brand cannibalization The results highlight sustainability as a dynamic process of recursive learning rather than a static moral condition, governed by bounded rationality and adaptive inference The proposed framework offers analytical foundations for designing sustainable communication and pricing strategies that align ethical credibility with economic performance and long term competitive stability
کلیدواژهها
نویسندگان
شیوه ارجاع
Amiri, Somayeh and Alinaghian, Mahdi and Khosroshahi, Hossein,1404,When Sustainability Competes with Itself: Bayesian Moral Signaling and the Paradox of Green Consumer Behavior,The 4th systems thinking in practice conference,Mashhad
ارائهشده در
مجموعه مقالات چهارمین کنفرانس بین المللی تفکر سیستمی در عمل12 آذر 1404 · مشهد